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ABSTRACT
The real-time bidding (RTB), aka programmatic buying,
has recently become the fastest growing area in online ad-
vertising. Instead of bulking buying and inventory-centric
buying, RTB mimics stock exchanges and utilises computer
algorithms to automatically buy and sell ads in real-time;
It uses per impression context and targets the ads to spe-
cific people based on data about them, and hence dramat-
ically increases the effectiveness of display advertising. In
this paper, we provide an empirical analysis and measure-
ment of a production ad exchange. Using the data sam-
pled from both demand and supply side, we aim to provide
first-hand insights into the emerging new impression selling
infrastructure and its bidding behaviours, and help identi-
fying research and design issues in such systems. From our
study, we observed that periodic patterns occur in various
statistics including impressions, clicks, bids, and conversion
rates (both post-view and post-click), which suggest time-
dependent models would be appropriate for capturing the
repeated patterns in RTB. We also found that despite the
claimed second price auction, the first price payment in fact
is accounted for 55.4% of total cost due to the arrangement
of the soft floor price. As such, we argue that the setting of
soft floor price in the current RTB systems puts advertisers
in a less favourable position. Furthermore, our analysis on
the conversation rates shows that the current bidding strat-
egy is far less optimal, indicating the significant needs for
optimisation algorithms incorporating the facts such as the
temporal behaviours, the frequency and recency of the ad
displays, which have not been well considered in the past.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is one of the most fast growing area
in IT industry. Over the past 10 years, its revenue has in-
creased from $6.0 billion in 2002 to $36.6 in 2012, with a
compound annual growth rate of 19.7%. The display-related
advertising revenues totalled $12 billion in 2012, with a 9%
increase from 2011 [1]. In display advertising the most sig-
nificant concept in recent years is real-time bidding (RTB),
or programmatic buying, where advertisers have the ability
of making decisions for every impression (auction). In this
paper we report interesting findings from field studies in a
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production ad exchange, and discuss related research chal-
lenges. RTB is a demand-side oriented concept. However,
we use data from both advertisers and publishers for a better
understanding of the bidding behaviour.
We illustrate briefly the structure and history of display
online advertising in Figure 1. Throughout the paper we
used advertiser/bidder/buyer/demand side interchangeably
to comply with the industrial tradition. Since an advertiser
rarely complete against himself, we consider a campaign is
equivalent to an advertiser in our study. The case is sim-
ilar for publisher where we used seller/supply side/website
interchangeably.
Before the emergence of RTB in 2009 (i.e., announcement
of support by major ad exchanges [16]), the display advertis-
ing market was mainly divided by premium contracts (since
1994), which take more than 40% of impressions, and ad net-
works (since 1996), which take the rest of impressions that
were usually referred to as remnant. With premium con-
tracts, publishers negotiate and make deals with advertisers
directly, c.f. Block I in Figure 1. Advertisers usually propose
to buy certain amount of impressions from the given place-
ments, regardless of the identities of users, when and how
many times they have seen the ad, and so on. The purchase
is totally about impressions and relies on the reputation of
the publisher and reported audience profiles [11, 6, 2]. At the
other end, the publisher needs to guarantee the delivery of
impressions that have been agreed upon otherwise a penalty
fee would be incurred [25, 27]. The pricing model used in
contracts are mostly cost-per-mille (CPM). Since advertisers
have no control over the inventories or users, it is more diffi-
cult to deploy goal-driven campaigns (e.g booking a ticket)
than branding ones (e.g announcing a new product). These
contracts are sometimes called guaranteed delivery display
advertising [5].
With ad networks, publishers register placements and of-
fer impressions from them for sale. Impressions are largely
sold using the second price auction in ad networks. Adver-
tisers (or their delegates) also register with ad networks to
participate in auctions. C.f. Block II in Figure 1. How-
ever the impressions in ad networks are non-guaranteed, as
opposed to premium contracts.
It is the ad network’s responsibility to understand the
webpage and the user, and to select advertisers based on
their pre-defined targeting rules. The understanding of web-
page is usually referred to as contextual advertising, where
ad networks crawl, parse, and extract keywords which sum-
marise the target. Advertisers bid on these keywords which
is very similar to sponsored search [24, 33, 3, 29]. A more
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advanced approach is to learn a model including various fea-
tures of webpages, which could then be used to compute a
relevance score of advertisers’ targeting criteria [17, 7, 8].
The understanding of user is usually referred to as behaviour
targeting, where ad networks utilise the browsing history of
a specific user to infer his interests, as well as geographical
location, local time, etc for target matching [32, 23, 30].
In ad networks advertisers largely adopt the cost-per-click
(CPC) or cost-per-acquisition (CPA) pricing models where
they only pay when certain goal is achieved. These choices
reduce their risks thus are good for goal-driven campaigns.
But then it is ad networks’ responsibility to optimise to max-
imise clicks or conversions. In order to take the measurement
of performance into account, ad networks usually employ
the generalised second price auction (GSP) [13] which allow
them to apply bid biases (e.g the quality score) that usually
weight the historical clickthrough rate (CTR) or conversion
rate (CVR) heavily.
For the publisher side, an important research topic is to
allocate impressions to premium contracts and ad networks.
If chooses contracts, the publisher also needs to decide which
specific contract to fulfil when multiple contracts having
overlapping targeting rules. It is possible that ad networks
bring in more revenue, but if a publisher sends too many im-
pressions to this revenue channel and fails to fulfil a contract,
he needs to pay the good-will penalty. In [27] the authors
used a two-phase models to sample, compute a compact al-
location plan, and assign impressions online to advertisers
who submit contracts with overlapping targeting rules. This
balancing problem was discussed in [25] by using a certainty
equivalent control heuristic to show the necessity of using
both channels to reach the global maximum revenue. In [15]
it was generalised as an online stochastic optimisation prob-
lem where given a set of resources, demands for resource
arrive online with associated properties. Given a general
priori about the demands, one has to decide whether and
how to satisfy a demand when it arrives. The goal is to
find a valid assignment (strategy) with the maximum total
payoff.
When there were more and more ad networks, a problem
led to the birth of ad exchanges: the excessive impressions
in some ad networks. It is preferable to have more demand
than supply because intense competition leads to higher rev-
enue of both ad networks and publishers. However, when
there are plenty of impressions unsold, ad networks try hard
to find buyers. Besides, a common practice for advertis-
ers was to register with multiple ad networks to find cheap
inventories, or at least to find enough impressions within
their budget constraints. They only found that managing
numerous channels difficult and inefficient (e.g how to split
the budget). Ad exchanges, like Google AdX, Yahoo! Right
Media, Microsoft ad exchange, were created to address this
problem by connecting hundreds of ad networks together,
c.f. Block III in Figure 1. Advertisers now have a higher
chance to locate enough impressions with preferred target-
ing rules; publishers may received higher profit, too, because
of more bidders potentially.
There are new research problems introduced by ad ex-
changes. In the pioneer work of [20] the author discussed
several issues including the truthfulness of auctions [19], call-
out optimisation [9], arbitrage bidding and risk analysis, etc.
The most significant feature introduced by ad exchanges is
real-time bidding, which queries bidders for a bid for every
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Figure 1: A brief illustration of the history and structure of dis-
play online advertising. Ad networks were created to aggregate
advertisers and publishers. Ad exchanges were created to resolve
the unbalance of demand and supply in ad networks. Premium
advertisers and publishers now choose to work with ad exchanges
through demand-side platform (DSP) and supply-side platform
(SSP) to take the advantage of real-time bidding (RTB). The ar-
rows with number describe the process of RTB: an impression is
created then passed to ad exchanges; advertisers are contacted
through DSPs; advertisers choose to buy 3rd party data option-
ally. Then following reversed path, bids are return to the ad
exchange, then the SSP or ad network, and winner’s ad will be
display to the user on the publisher’s website. The link between
SSP and data exchange, as well as those among ad exchanges, are
potentially useful however not widely adopted in current market-
place.
impression. Along with the query, ad exchanges send meta
data of the webpage and the user. The exposure of this
meta data enables advertisers to switch from the inventory-
centric to user-centric optimisation. There are also notewor-
thy attempts to introduce concepts from finance market [28].
These attempts will make the ad exchange more mature and
attractive.
When advertisers want to take advantage of RTB, they
work with ad exchanges through 3rd party platform that are
usually referred to as demand-side platform (DSP). DSPs
are delegates of advertisers that answer bidding requests and
optimise campaigns at the impression level. Comparing with
ad networks, the advantages of using DSPs are: 1) advertis-
ers do not need to manage their registration with many ad
networks; 2) they can optimise at a finer granularity and a
higher frequency because of local impression logs instead of
aggregated reports from ad networks; 3) DSPs are also more
customisable to better suit advertisers’ goals. For example,
advertisers traditionally set a frequency cap on their cam-
paigns (the maximum times to display the ad to the same
user). Now the cap can be applied to user groups, or even a
single user for optimal efficiency.
At the other end, supply-side platforms (SSP) were cre-
ated to serve publishers. Similarly, SSPs provide a central
management console with various tools for publishers’ ulti-
mate goal: the yield optimisation. For example, SSPs allow
publishers to set a reserve price for a specific placement,
or even against a specific advertiser. Some SSPs also allow
publishers to have preference over bidders (bid bias).
In Figure 1 arrows with number describe the process of
RTB:
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Figure 2: The normalised impression time series snippet by hour.
A clear daily pattern and less clear weekly pattern, that less vis-
itors come to the website, can be observed. The data is from a
single website but the pattern is very similar for all websites we
evaluated. The green dotted line denotes the impressions from
the front page; the red segmented line denotes the impressions
from the second-level pages (i.e. those are linked to directly from
the front page).
1. An impression is created on publisher’s website;
2. The bidding request is sent to ad exchanges through
ad network or SSP;
3. The ad exchanges query DSPs for advertisers’ bids;
4. The DSP could contact data exchanges for 3rd party
user data;
5. The bid is generated and submitted; winner will be
selected at ad exchanges, then at SSP. Following the
reversed path the winner’s ad will be displayed on pub-
lisher’s website to the specific user.
Note that ad exchanges normally only query DSPs for
bids, not ad networks. Also note that there are two types of
links missing from the current marketplace. We find these
links interesting and potentially useful. Firstly, SSPs nor-
mally do not contact data exchanges for 3rd party user data.
However, if publishers could understand and model specific
users, they will be in a better position of revenue optimisa-
tion (e.g setting up an optimal reserve price for this auction
based on the forecast of bidding activity with user data), al-
though such query would incur cost. Secondly, ad exchanges
normally do not send impressions to each other even if they
remain unsold. This is largely due to business considera-
tions and it leads to the fact that DSPs and SSPs register
with multiple ad exchanges. A unified and interconnected
marketplace is what we find attractive and it is certainly
good for the whole eco-system.
In the remaining of this paper we represent our empirical
study on a production ad exchange. We analyse the vari-
ous datasets from both demand and supply side and report
research challenges introduced by ad exchanges and RTB.
2. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RTB
We first report the statistics of dataset used in the em-
pirical study and represent some general analysis on bidders
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Figure 3: The normalised click time series snippet by hour from
the same website as of Figure 2. A clear daily pattern with lots
of noises exists, too. Other websites we investigated had the very
similar pattern.
and bids. Then we discuss two specific aspects (bidding be-
haviour, frequency and recency factor) and associated prob-
lems (floor price detection, daily pacing, and selective bid-
ding).
2.1 Dataset and the System’s Properties
We conducted our study in a production ad exchange
based in the UK. Datasets were created both for demand
and supply side. For advertisers, we sampled impression,
click, and conversion logs from Feb to May 2013. In to-
tal we sampled 52,850,635 impressions, 72,958 clicks, and
37,978 conversions. Note that we sampled the conversions
only and back traced associated clicks and impressions to
make the dataset self-contained (i.e. any impressions and
clicks associating with a sampled conversion would be in the
dataset). Since these datasets were sampled, we also used
various reports (e.g analytical performance, site domain, at-
tributed conversions, frequency/recency distribution, and so
on) to understand the overall performance of advertisers.
We also recorded auction logs for placements from regis-
tered publishers of the ad exchange. In total we sampled
12,965,119 auctions from 50 placements, ranging from 14
Dec 2012 to 24 May 2013. These placements are from 16
websites of different categories, including news, finance, pc
& console games, gadgets, sports, entertainment, and so on.
Since auction logs were sampled, we also used various re-
ports to understand the overall performance of publishers.
In the following of this section we report some statistics
that we found interesting in the study.
2.1.1 Periodic Patterns
Due to the common daily routine of human there are al-
ways periodic patterns of our activity. In Figure 2 and Fig-
ure 3 we can observe clear daily patterns of both impressions
and clicks from a single website. For number of impressions,
there was also a weak weekly pattern that during weekends
less visitors come to the website. There was also a daily
pattern for conversions: during daytime the numbers of con-
versions were larger and the CVRs were higher compared to
sleeping hours, c.f. Figure 5 and Figure 4.
Note there are two types of conversions: post-click that
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Figure 4: The distribution of normalised post-view and post-click
CVR against time. The plot was created using all conversions
in the demand-side dataset. The error bar shows the standard
deviation. The plot shows that the CVRs were higher during
daytime.
0 5 10 15 20
hour of day
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
co
u
n
t
post-view
0 5 10 15 20
hour of day
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
post-click
Figure 5: The distribution of number of post-view and post-click
conversions against time. The plot was created using all conver-
sions in the demand-side dataset.
the user saw an impression, clicked, and finally converted
(while remaining on the advertiser’s website and without
any interruption); post-view that the user saw an impression,
but did not click, but still converts (by visiting the website
later on directly). These two types were plotted separately.
2.1.2 The Impact of the Soft Floor Price
In modern ad exchanges publishers are usually given the
option to set a soft floor price ps along with the hard floor
price (the traditional reserve price) ph. The auction pro-
cess is illustrated in Figure 6. By setting a high soft floor
price (e.g $1000 CPM), the publisher can change the auction
from 2nd price to 1st price auction, which always charges
the winner the amount that he bids. Unlike the hard floor,
advertisers sometimes are not aware the existence of a soft
floor, especially in RTB environment.
We checked the ratio of the (effective) 1st price auction
and the 2nd price auction in the dataset, using impression
logs that include bid price and price paid. There was no
explicit indicator of the auction mechanism being employed,
thus we used the simple heuristics: when (bid price = price
paid), we considered it 1st price auction. In total, there were
about 40% impressions that were bought in 1st price auc-
tions. However, these impressions accounted for 55.4% of
total cost. The existence of soft floor prices and the heuris-
tics used could be examined in Figure 9. To our best extent
of knowledge this mixture of auction mechanisms is largely
unaware of. The complicated setting, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 6, puts advertisers in a not favourable position and could
damage the advertising eco-system. From the advertisers’
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Figure 6: An illustration of the auction process in modern ad
exchanges. The auction mechanisms are mixed and extended by
introducing floor prices. The soft floor price is also in popularity
but the impact of such mixture is largely unaware of. The com-
plicated setting puts advertisers in an unfavourable position and
could damage the eco-system.
perspective, it is worth exploring the floor prices setting
by different publishers and act accordingly. For example,
a winner may choose to lower his bid (while still winning) to
reduce the cost in a high soft floor scenario (the first price
auction). Meanwhile, the advertiser who could react to its
competitors’ moves fastest has a substantial advantage [13];
but if its the second price auction, the exploration activities
only incur unnecessary cost.
2.2 Bidding Behaviours
We now study the advertisers bidding behaviours influ-
enced by the design of the RTB systems.
2.2.1 Bids’ Distribution
A widely adopted assumption in optimal auction design
research is that the private values of advertisers follow log-
normal distribution [21, 14, 31, 22]. Bids are then generated
from the private values. However, in the dataset we found
that the 1st highest bid did not show strong log-normal dis-
tribution properties, nor did the 1st and 2nd highest bids,
or all bids.
We split auctions by hour-of-day since bids vary greatly
throughout a day, c.f. Figure 7. From 50 placements and 160
days we obtained 192k <placement, hour> tuples. For each
tuple we fit highest bids, highest + second highest bids, and
all bids of every pair to Log-normal (actually to Normal after
taking the logarithm) however the result is poor. There were
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Figure 7: The time series snippet of winning bids and its hourly
average of a single placement. The hourly average series peaks
around 6-8am every day when there are less impressions but more
bidders.
less than 1% accepted by either the Shapiro-Wilk test [26]
or the Anderson-Darling test [4], regardless of the number
of bidders or impressions in that hour.
2.2.2 The Daily Pacing
The daily pacing refers to the way that advertisers spend
their budget in a single day. Usually an advertiser submits
a daily budget for his campaign, and choose from spend-
ing it evenly throughout a day (uniform pacing) and as fast
as possible (no pacing). The no pacing setup may lead to
premature stop easily, which means the budget depletes too
quickly so advertisers cannot capture traffic later in the day,
that may have high quality impressions. An instance of pre-
mature stop is illustrated in Figure 9 (day 1). The uniform
pacing also suffers from the traffic problem: if high qual-
ity impressions appear in early part of the day, the pacing
setup would not be able to capture all of them; if there is
not enough traffic in the late part of the day, the pacing
setup would not be able to spend all the budget (usually
called under-delivery). In sum they are not good daily pac-
ing strategies although being widely used in DSPs.
In Figure 8 we plot the hourly mean of number of bidders
and number of impressions, that were normalised respec-
tively. There is a clear lag of when these two series reach
their maximum in a day. Generally speaking, the number of
bidders peaks in the morning but the number of impressions
peaks afterwards. This lag indicates the unbalance of supply
and demand of the market in certain hours. For example,
there are more bidders competing over limited impressions
in the morning, resulting in high winning bids as shown in
Figure 7, which in turn costs more of advertisers. However,
this higher cost does not necessarily lead to higher perfor-
mance. From Figure 4 we can see that both post-view and
post-clicks CVR peak in the evening, which argues that in-
tense bidding activities in the early hours are not reasonable.
This distribution of number of bidders throughout a day
may be due to the mixture of hour-of-day targeting and no
daily pacing setup. Most of advertisers wish to skip the last
night hours because of the low CVR. Some of them may use
the no daily pacing setup to avoid the risk of under-delivery
as we discussed before. When these bidders start to bid in
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Figure 8: The distribution of number of bidders and impressions
against hour-of-day. Their correlation plot shows a clear lag of
when they reach the maximum in a day. This lag indicates the
unbalance of supply and demand of the market in certain hours.
Besides, the fact that there are more bidders in the morning may
be due to the mixture of hour-of-day targeting and no daily pacing
setup. The plots used 3 months worth of data sampled from a
single placement. Note for some placements the lag was not very
clear.
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Figure 9: An interesting instance we found in the dataset: an
advertiser switched from no pacing to even daily pacing. He was
bidding at a flat CPM. With ad exchanges, the large amount of
available inventories could deplete a daily budget quickly. How-
ever, even daily pacing is far from optimal because it does not
consider the performance (e.g ROI) in different time slots. Note
that in practice the pacing engine would spend slightly more in
the beginning of the day to learn the available impressions and to
calculate the spending speed, especially for campaigns with small
budgets.
the morning, they win lots of impressions with high bids,
and they quit as their budgets depletes quickly. We leave
the validation of this hypothesis to the future works.
A reasonable alternative is the dynamic pacing against the
performance. It is intuitively correct to spend more budget
in hours that generate more clicks or conversions, and less
in low performing hours.
Note that this problem is not the same as a typical bud-
geted multi-arm bandit problem that has been discussed
extensively in the literature [18, 12, 10]: 1) In this allo-
cation problem the advertiser can only explore the current
time unit; 2) There is potential over or under-delivery in a
time unit due to the latency in the practical implementa-
tion. Therefore revising the remaining budget is required
after every time step.
2.3 Conversion Rates and Selective Bidding
Considering the maintenance cost (e.g servers and band-
width) it is not wise for an advertiser to submit a bid every
time he receives a bidding request. Among various factors
that he uses to decide to bid or not, the frequency and re-
cency factor are important ones that have not been given
enough attention to.
2.3.1 The Frequency Factor
The frequency factor (or frequency cap, FC) defines how
many times ads (a.k.a. creatives) would be displayed to a
single user. It can be applied to campaign groups, cam-
paigns, and creatives separately. For example, given a cam-
paign with 3 ads, an advertiser could set FC(campaign) =
6, FC(ad1) = 2, FC(ad2) = 3, and FC(ad3) = 4 and these
settings would work together. The same user would at most
see ad1 twice, ad2 three times, ad3 four times, and all ads
displayed to him together would not exceed six times.
The frequency factor is normally set based on historical
data and needs to be adjusted constantly during the flight
time of the campaign, because different campaigns ask for
very different FCs, as illustrated in Figure 10. The campaign
1 from the left plot received the highest CVR with 6-10 im-
pressions, which is also true for the cumulative CVR metrics.
However the campaign 2 from the right plot received the
highest CVR with 2-5 impressions. If the campaign 1 sets a
frequency cap of 2-5 impressions, most of conversions would
not be achieved. If the campaign 2 sets a frequency cap of
6-10, nearly half of impressions could be wasted. Therefore,
a good FC setting is crucial to the efficiency of advertising.
Before setting an optimal FC, we need to find the right
metrics to measure the efficiency of different FCs. See the
example in Table 1 where we compare popular metrics. As-
sume there are 100 users; the CPM is fixed at 10; the ad-
vertiser’s conversion goal is worth 500. From the table we
can see using different metrics could lead to very different
decision. If the advertiser uses CVR as most of advertisers
do, he would go for FC=3; if the advertiser cares more about
the total number of conversions, he would use FC=5; if the
advertiser cares more about CPA he would use FC=3, too;
if the advertiser measures the performance against the profit
and cost, he would go for FC=2.
Using FC = 2 seems the most profitable. However, choos-
ing FC = 3 is reasonable, too, especially when considering
the long term impact: FC = 3 gives more conversions at low
cost, and once these users are attracted they have a higher
chance of converting again in future.
2.3.2 The Recency Factor
The recency factor (or recency cap, RC) helps to decide
to bid or not based on how recently the ad was displayed
to the same user. It also works at different levels including
campaign groups, campaigns, and creatives. For example,
an advertiser can set RC(campaign) = (1 hour) so that all
ads from this campaign would be displayed to the same user
only once in every hour. Similar to the frequency factor,
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Figure 10: The frequency against CVR plot from two different
campaigns. The campaign 1 from the left plot received the high-
est CVR with 6-10 impressions, which is also true for the cumu-
lative CVR metrics. However the campaign 2 from the right plot
received the highest CVR with 2-5 impressions. If the campaign
1 sets a frequency cap of 2-5 impressions, most of conversions
would not be achieved. If the campaign 2 sets a frequency cap of
6-10, nearly half of impressions could be wasted.
fc cvr (cumulative) cvr convs cpa roi
1 0.0000 0.0000 0 - 0.00
2 0.0150 0.0150 3 667 1.50
3 0.0067 0.0167 2 600 1.25
4 0.0025 0.0150 1 667 1.00
5 0.0020 0.0140 1 714 0.88
6 0.0000 0.0117 0 857 0.70
7 0.0000 0.0100 0 1000 0.58
Table 1: The comparison of different metrics against frequency
caps (FC). Note cvr and convs are fc specific, i.e. the extra value
could be gained by increasing the frequency cap from the previous
level to the current one. The cumulative cvr is the CVR adver-
tisers use: total conversions divided by total impressions. The
cpa gives the cost-per-acquisition. The roi gives the return-on-
investment based on the advertiser’s conversion valuation. These
values are calculated by assuming there are 100 users; the CPM
is fixed at 10; the advertiser’s conversion goal is worth 500.
RCs are useful to achieve the best advertising efficiency. For
example, displaying ads intensively incurs high cost but little
effect (or even getting people annoyed) for some campaigns
(e.g financial services). Users need to think, compare, then
make decisions. A better strategy is to display the same
ad right after the thinking time to remind users. However,
for some campaigns (e.g booking flight) users would convert
very quickly or not convert at all, which requires relatively
intense advertising.
Figure 11 plots the RC against CVR of two different cam-
paigns in the dataset. Both campaigns show the highest
CVR at the 1-5 minutes level. However for the campaign 2
the CVR is still not negligible after a long time (14-30 days).
If the advertiser uses a more strict RC setting (e.g do not
display ads to users who were first exposed 14 days ago) he
could lose potential conversions. On the other hand, using a
loose RC setting for the campaign 1 will only waste budget
since the CVR is very low after 14 days.
Another interesting observation is given in Figure 12. Sim-
ilarly to the frequency factor, the analysis of efficiency of
RCs requires metrics based on the understanding of adver-
tising goal, which we do not repeat here.
1-5 minutes
5-15 minutes
15-30 minutes
30-60 minutes
1-4 hours
4-12 hours
12-24 hours
1-2 days
2-7 days
7-14 days
14-30 days
campaign 1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
conversion rate (normalised)
1-5 minutes
5-15 minutes
15-30 minutes
30-60 minutes
1-4 hours
4-12 hours
12-24 hours
1-2 days
2-7 days
7-14 days
14-30 days
im
p
re
ss
io
n
s
campaign 2
Figure 11: The recency factor against CVR plot from two different
campaigns. Both campaigns show the highest CVR at the 1-5
minutes level. However for the campaign 2 the CVR is still not
negligible after a long time (14-30 days). If the advertiser uses a
more strict RC setting (e.g do not display ads to users who were
first exposed 14 days ago) he could lose potential conversions. On
the other hand, using a loose RC setting for the campaign 1 will
only waste budget since the CVR is very low after 14 days.
The above analysis shows the importance of setting up
proper FCs and RCs. At present these settings are at most
at the creative level. With real-time bidding, advertisers can
push them to a finer granularity: setting FCs and RCs for
individual users. The individual FCs and RCs can then be
used to decide to bid or not on a specific impression.
3. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the history of real-time bid-
ding and discussed research issues related to the demand
side. In fact, RTB, ad exchanges, and DSP are concep-
tual ideas; what we really want to explore are the behaviour
of advertisers and their delegates in the market, and the
challenges brought by the impression-level bidding and user-
centric bidding, distinguished from bulk buying and inventory-
centric buying. Through analysis of datasets acquired from
a production ad exchange, we discovered that floor price
detection, daily pacing, and frequency/recency setting are
problems not addressed. We explained their importance to
advertisers however leave the development and evaluation of
algorithms to the future works.
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